From Master to
Wage Labor:
Chinese
Workers at the Turn of the New Millennium
Baogang Guo, Ph.D.
Department of History and
Political Science
Thomas College
Thomasville, GA 31792
Tel: (912) 227-6361 (H)
Tel: (912) 226-1621 (O)
E-mail:
bguo@thomascollege.edu
From Master to Wage Labor:
Chinese Workers at the Turn of the New Millennium
Abstract
As China's economic reform
deepens, labor's political and economic interests have been victimized. To understand the roots of current tension
between the state and labor, this article examines Chinese labor policy in the
context of two labor reforms. Labor reform
in the1950s was based on the growth in the scope and scale of the government's
commitment to laborers. The new reform
of 1990s, however, has shifted government's focus from "breakthrough"
politics and welfare socialism to rationalization of the policies already in
place. Faced with the reduced
legitimacy of the government in the eyes of unhappy workers, the state must
readjust its role to facilitate the emergence of the new tripartite labor
relationship.
For years, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has maintained that
workers are masters of the society. However, in the last few years, labor
discontent has spread rapidly. Signs of labor unrest are seen in many parts of
the country, especially in those areas where business restructuring, mergers
and bankruptcies have taken big tolls on the livelihood of million of workers
and their families. Labor's dissatisfaction with their economic and political
rights is increasingly becoming a de-stabilizing factor in China.
There has been extensive
coverage of the recent Chinese labor movement by the news media in the West.
Economists and sociologists have also paid due attention to the issue. But political scientists have paid
relatively less attention to the political significance of the recent
development. This study will examine current
labor issues in the context of two labor reforms: the labor reform in the1950s
and the labor reform in the 1990s. Both
reforms have an important bearing on the status of Chinese labor's political
power, social prestige, and economic interest. By comparing these two reforms,
we can better understand the roots of labor discontent in China and points out some
possible solutions for resolving these potentially explosive issues.
The focus of this study is on the state-labor relationship. Questions to be discussed include: Is the
relationship between the Chinese state and the workers fundamentally
adversarial or collaborative? [1] Is there any resemblance between labor
policy in China and corporatist labor policy in the West? [2] What impact will market reform have on labor
rights? In the following discussion,
we will first examine labor policy and labor rights in the 1950s; then, we will
examine labor issues in the 1990s; and finally, the paper will compare the two
reforms and discuss the policy implications.
Labor Reform of the 1950s
Labor has an important place
in socialist theory and practice. The ideology of Marxism is based on the
assumption that after the "conquest of power by the proletariat,"
labor will no longer be a commodity, and the accumulated labor, the capital,
"is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the
laborer." Marx and Engels
proclaimed that in overthrowing capitalism, "[t]he proletarians have
nothing to lose but their chains." [3] With this grand vision and historical
mission, the Chinese Communists fought tirelessly to seize political power. The
founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 marked the beginning of the
first transformation of the state-labor relation.
The theory of socialist
transformation demands a transfer of the ownership of the means of production
to the state and the public; the elimination of the wage labor system; and a
fair distribution of economic wealth.
Before the communist revolution, China had a very small capitalist
economy. The working conditions of
laborers before
1949 have been studied extensively.[4] In general, low wages, long hours under poor
working conditions, and general ill treatment were the primary grievances. The unique system of Baogong (contract labor system) allowed the middlemen to control
workers' wages and to dictate the terms of labor contracts.[5] Frequent labor strikes were the only defense
workers could resort to. What made the CCP attractive to common workers was its
promise to build a "workers' paradise" in China and to
"liberate" workers from exploitation by domestic and international
capitalists.
With a goal to emulate
Soviet style state socialism, China took only a few short years to eliminate
all private-owned enterprises, commerce, transportation and craft-making
industries, and completed the initial stage of socialist transformation. Many
state-owned factories were built during the periods of the first and second
Five-year Plans. Millions of farmers
joined industrial labor forces (see Table 1).
In 1949 there were only 8 million workers in the state-own enterprises.
By 1981, this number jumped to 83.7 million.
It is ironic to point out the fact that the very social class that is
supposed to make the communist revolution is in fact largely a creation of the
communist revolution.
Table 1 Number
of Workers in the Public Sector (in
million)
____________________________________________________________________________________
Enterprises 1949 1952 1965 1975 1981
____________________________________________________________________________________
State-Owned 8 15.8 37* 64* 83.7
Collectively-owned - 0.2 12* 22* 25.7
____________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: CCP Secretariat and ACFL, The Condition of the Working Class in China (Beijing, Central Party School Publishing House, 1983), trans. by International Journal Political Economy (Spring 1995) Vol. 25. No.1 *Estimated numbers
Labor reform in this period
was carried out in the areas of wage, management, and social security. The wage
reform standardized the wages and salaries.
State-owned enterprises and institutions had to follow guidelines and
wage standards set up by the State Council.
Although the state managed to keep the real wage significantly lower
than what workers deserved, workers obtained many generous fringe benefits,
including medical care, child care, kindergarten, schooling, pension and public
housing. The government invested heavily
in those areas. For instance, in 1950, there were only 1,800 kindergartens
enrolling140,000 children, by 1958, there were 700,000 kindergartens enrolling
29 million kids.
Working conditions and
workplace safety were improved. In 1951 the new Insurance Regulation set up
a generous welfare system for workers.
According to the regulation, enterprises were obligated to pay for
labors' life, health and retirement insurance to cover their injury, sickness
and retirement. Workers paid no
premium.
Chart 1. State-built Workers' New Housing Units (unit:
square meters)

Sources: State
Statistical Bureau: Weida De Shinian (The
Great Ten Years)(Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1959), p. 192
Workers who were disabled due to work related
injuries could get their health care covered entirely,
plus 75% of their regular wages paid until their death. When workers retired they would receive
30-60% of their regular wages till their death. Female workers could get two-month paid maternity leave. [6] Unions and enterprise were also responsible
for operating collective insurance system which provided rehabilitation and
leisure facilities such as worker sanatorium, disability home, orphanage, etc.[7]
State-paid health insurance expanded gradually. In 1952, only 4 million workers were covered. By 1958, nearly 7 million workers were
covered. By the1980s, most workers were
included in the unit-based welfare system.

The most important
change was workers' social status. Wage
labor system was abolished. At the
center of the improvement was the equality of status between workers and the
management. Workers were allowed to participate in the decision making process
Chart 2 Beneficiaries of the
Labor Insurance System (unit:
10,000)
Sources: State Statistics Bureau: Weida De Shinian (The Great Ten Years)(Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1959) , p.193
in enterprises.
Managers were mostly chosen
from workers, and were supposed to be "civil servants" of
workers. Managers and technical staff
were required to spend time to work together with workers. The distinction and
function of laborers and management was un-clarified and
non-differentiated. Managers functioned
in many ways as social service providers who were overwhelmed with workers'
welfare issues. They acted as
bargain-hunter to negotiate with the paternal state to maximize the
availability of national resources to their own employees.[8]
Women joined work forces in large numbers; wage discrimination was
made illegal. Physical abuse of workers
was prohibited. Workers were asked to concern themselves with national and
enterprise affairs. Political meetings
and study sessions were common in workplaces.
A model worker system was established to reward workers who excelled in their
work performance. Emulation rather than
competition were encouraged to promote work efficiency and raise productivity.
Workers who had worked
before 1949 appreciated their newly acquired economic security and political
equality. Farmer-turned workers were even more complacent about their improved
economic status. Both of them became
the most important source of social support to the communist state.
To be sure, there were many
sectional and regional variances in workers' political status, social prestige
and economic welfare. Small scale of labor disputes did exist. But overall, the
relationship between the state and workers were collaborative rather than
adversarial. This was partially
achieved through CCP's control over trade union organizations. In June 1950, the government proclaimed the Trade Union Law. The government organized workers' congresses
and labor unions. Workers
could join the union on a voluntary basis. A
centralized unitary system of union organization was established. On top of the hierarchy was the All China
Federation of Trade Unions. Underneath
it were provincial and county trade unions. A superior Union organization must approve
the establishment of any local union organization. Only one union was allowed in each unit.
Unions were treated as the
peripheral organization of the ruling party. The CCP claimed absolute leadership
over the union. Trade unions was described as ”schools of communism” or
"transmission belts." But
their primary duty was to protect state interest and to promote production and
worker discipline, with only secondary responsibility to represent workers and
reflect their concerns and voices. For
most union members, the union was merely a welfare organization and a
friendship club. Although there were
five attempts by the union leaders at various times to acquire more autonomy
from the party, each ended up with failure. [9]
From very early on, the ruling party's endorsement of union leaders was a
must. Many key union leaders were
communist leaders at the same time. Financially, most of the half million union
leaders were on government payroll.
Union cadres at and above county level were considered to be state
cadres who could receive a salary equivalent to a deputy administer in the
government, and enjoy all other admired material benefits such as pension,
travel and health care. Union members
paid 2% of their wages or salary as union dues. Enterprises and institutions contributed another 2% of their
total wages and salary payment to unions.
Government also subsidized unions in many ways. In addition to direct financing, union's
office and meeting places were to be provided by the enterprise and
institutions.
Many recent studies have
pointed out the corporatist nature of China's labor policy. [10] Like many European countries in their
initial stage of industrialization, the Chinese new state actively promotes
cooperation and collaboration between the state and labor. The state wants workers to believe that the
antagonistic relationship between the state and capitalist on the one hand and
working class on the other has become a thing of the past. Indeed, cooperation and collaboration characterized
the new relationship between the state and labor throughout the 1950s. In the following three decades, labor policy
was subjected to many changes, but the scope and scale of the state's
commitments towards laborers continued to expand, and eventually reached the
breakdown point by the end of the 1980s.
Labor Reform of the 1990s
Since1979,
China has moved away quickly from the command economy. Labor reform is an
important part of the economic reform, which has many ups and downs in the past
two decades. But it is clear by the
early 1990s that the reform is geared towards the abolishment of the
"welfare socialism" established between the 1950s and 1970s.[11]
Under the new condition of market socialism, the state-labor relations are
rapidly changing.
Reforms at enterprise level
were lunched in the 1980s. The Factory Director Responsibility System was
introduced to give enterprise directors or managers broader power of making
production-related decisions. The long-discredited Taylor management system was
once again reintroduced in the name of improving efficiency and productivity. The managerial reform was soon followed by
personnel reform and wage reform. The
power of managers was further enhanced by the "Regulation on Transforming
the Management Mechanism of State-Owned Enterprises" of 1992. As a results
of these reforms, enterprises now are free to hire workers without restriction
as to type of recruitment; number of employees hired, or terms of labor
contracts. They are also free to set
wages and to promote management from the ranks of ordinary workers. The
centerpiece of the wage labor system-- the contract labor system--has been
restored and promoted nationwide since 1986.
Labor Department required all types of employers to sign labor contract
with their employees by the end of 1999.[12] A new labor contract law is being
drafted. Labor's "iron rice
bows" are broken. Masters are now
selling their labor to their employers as a commodity. Equal exchange and competition become the
norms of the market place.
To be sure, reforms do have
many positive impacts on workers’ life. Although workers lose their lifetime
employment privileges, they gain their freedom and mobility. Their economic
situation also improved steadily. Various schemes of wage reform have been
experimented at the enterprise level.
Floating pay, piecework pay, and obscure wage (mohu gongzi) are tactics used
to replace the fixed pay system. Both foreign-owned enterprises and state-owned
enterprises are beginning to adopt the Concealed Income Distribution System in
which managers decide workers’ actual wage, bonus and allowance. Employees are
not allowed to know each other’s wages.
After
nearly decades of drafting and revision, the Labor Law was finally adopted by the People's Congress in
1994. It codified many labor reform
measures. It stipulates that: (1) labor
contracts be included for all workers in all types of enterprises; (2) labor arbitration and inspection
divisions be established at all levels of provincial and local government to
resolve labor disputes; (3) collective
bargaining is formally allowed in all types of enterprises; and (4) enterprises
may be free to fire workers for economic reasons without prior consultation
with local government. [13]
Since the mid-1990s, the
reform of state-owned enterprises has been given the
highest priority by the government. The
Separation of the government from enterprises (zhengqi fenkai) is on top of the reformers' agenda. The drive to shed surplus workers is proceeding at full, yet cautious, speed, with the annual
reduction of worker forces in state-owned enterprises exceeding 15
million. When Zhu Rongji became Premier
of the State Council in 1998, he pushed for the completion of three more labor
market reforms in three years: social insurance reform, health care insurance reform and housing reform.[14] The social insurance reform includes an
unemployment insurance program to be paid for by a one percent payroll tax on
all types of enterprises, and will provide unemployment relief funds to
unemployed workers for up to two years.
A new pension system is also established which is paid for by mandatory
individual contributions from both employees and employers. The health care reform changed the old
system in which the government and enterprises pay all health care cost for
workers. The new system requires workers to pay two percent of their wages to
their individual insurance account to cover basic services. Enterprise contributions
will be pooled together to cover the cost of major illness.[15]
The housing reform started in July 1998. All housing allocation in the urban
areas will be stopped. Public housing has been gradually sold to workers at a
subsidized price.[16] Workers will have to purchase their own
housing from now on. Another major perk is gone. When all these mandatory contributions are combined many workers
find a third or more of their wage is deducted before they even see it.
All of these reforms have transformed the state
corporatist regime in China. Although
the new labor system mandated in the Labor
Law has not been fully realized, the law does lay a brand new framework for
future state-labor relations. Labor's
mobility means more freedom for workers in choosing their employers and place
to work. The collective bargaining
system provides labor with the opportunities to defend their interest and
improve their conditions. More importantly,
it gives the trade union an active and independent role in labor-management
relationship. Labor Law has codified a
three-way relationship between the state, labor and management to replace the
traditional two-way relationship between the labor and the state.
However, workers can also
feel the negative impact of the reform. Among them, the income polarization has been most troublesome. Reform has benefited many
laborers. Their absolute income has been
increased, and their standard of living has also been improved. But at the same time the income gap between managers and workers,
technicians and workers, workers in state-owned enterprises and workers in
foreign owned enterprises are widened significantly. The key value served to maintain the cooperative relationship
among all players in the game, namely, the sense of equality, is lost, and the phenomenon
of relative poverty, a term Marx used a century ago, has become a reality
despite the increase in workers' real wages.
Meanwhile
the problem of absolute poverty also strikes many workers and retirees. The current drive to reform the public
sectors through closure, shutdown, merger, transfer and bankruptcy has resulted
in a drastic increase in the number of out-post workers. Compared with 1997, the numbers of workers
in state-owned and collective-owned enterprises in 1998 was reduced by 15
million. The number of unemployed
workers reached 12.54 million.[17]
According to a survey conducted by Chinese Academy of Social Science in 1992,
the number of laid-off workers increased year by year.
Table 2 Number of Workers in the Public Sector (in million)
____________________________________________________________________________________
1981 1993 1997 1998
____________________________________________________________________________________
State-Owned 83.7 109.2 98 88
Collectively-owned 25.7 33.9 23 18.9
____________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: China Labor Union Statistical
yearbook (1993)
In 1999, the number of unemployed workers will reach
15 million.[18] With a rate
of labor redundancy of at least 30 percent in state sectors, millions more will
lose their jobs soon. Although the registered unemployment rate stands at 3.1%,
the real unemployment rate is believed to be 7-9%.[19]
For those who can not find a job, the only chance to survive is to depend on
the newly created unemployment insurance system and social welfare system.
Chart
3 Off-post Workers among Workers forces (unit: %)

Sources: Fu Shengqi,
"Xiagang Zhigong Yu Dalu Gong Chao (Laid-off Workers and Labor Unrest,
" China Spring, 1998, vol. 58,
The survey is based on data collected from 1,234 enterprises in 17 provinces
According to a survey in Henan province, some of the
trouble workers already encountered the fate of absolute poverty (see Table
3). In 1994, there were 7 million
workers nationwide living under poverty, or 20 million individuals when
workers’ family members are also taken into consideration. The per capita
income of these families was only 62 Yuan, or 42 percent of the national
average.[20]
In Liaoning province, 70% of unemployed are women. Only 50% of them will have a chance to be re-employed. Many who did find jobs might see their
income significantly lower than what they had before (see Table 4).
Reform's biggest impact is the marginalization of
workers in the workplace. The Director
Responsibility System gives managers tremendous amounts of powers to terminate
employees, to decrease and increase employees' pay or bonus, and to promote
Table 3 Unemployment
and Retirement Population in Henan (unit:
10,000)
___________________________________________________________________________________
total lose insurance or ratio ratio in absolute rate
Or pension payment poverty
____________________________________________________________________________________
Unemployed † 97 39 40% -- --
Retired ‡ 95 14 19% 5 6.8%
____________________________________________________________________________________
Sources:
He Lisheng & Lin Shixuan, "Tizhi Zhuanhuan Shiqi Henansheng Chengshi
Pingkunceng Y&anjiu (A Study of Urban Poverty in Henan in the Period of
System Changes" Henan Sheke Jie,
Dec 30, 1998
†1996;
‡ July 1997
Table 4 Reemployment Situation
for Suspended Employees from State-Run Enterprises in Ten Cities and Provinces (unit:
% 1994)
Reurned to Took
up Transferred found own Remained
Work after internally to work in work without
Training coordinated work tertiary sector work
Jiangxi 6.4 10.4 5.1 28.1 50.0
Gansu 1.7 71.3 7.2 5.3 14.5
Hebei 9.3 21.4 1.3 21.4 31.6
Shanxi 10.0 21.0 4.0 5.6 53.4
Shanghai -- 32.2 13.9 14.2 39.7
Shandong 13.1 23.9 19.9 9.0 34.1
Wuhan 28.6 6.6 5.0 59.8
Xi’an 8.0 31.6 47.0 14.0
Wenzhou -- 2.3 44.3 53.4
Harbin -- 5.0 16.0 23.0 48.0
Source: Chang
Kai, “A Survey and Investigation of Unemployment and Reemployment of female
Employees in State-Owned Enterprises,” Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, vol.
30, no.2, Winter 1997-98, p. 38 table 7.
employees to managerial positions. Many newly established township
factories and foreign-factories become modern day sweatshops. With little
fringe benefits and protections, labor rights are being sacrificed. [21]
The concept of workplace equality is replaced by hierarchical structures. In private-owned and foreign-owned
companies, the sense of mastership is totally lost. Workers in most situations dare not to challenge managers and
dare not to complain about their unfair treatment for fear of losing their jobs
or benefits.[22] Inhuman treatment, physical abuse,
compulsory overtime, high task quotas, military style of rules and regulations,
arbitrary fine and punishment let workers taste the bitterness of capitalism. Managers play the game of the secret bonus
system to reward workers. [23] Suffering from personal insult and physical
abuse, many workers are forced to take extreme actions. [24]
Labor disputes are on the rise. The Complaint Receiving Bureau (Xinfangju), under the joint control of
the Central Party Committee and the State Council, documented that it handled
87 percent more cases of workers' collective complaints and 164 percent more
individual complaints in 1993 than in 1990. During the same period, among 27
provinces surveyed 18 provinces had a marked increase in collective complaints
and 21 provinces had a sharp increase in workers’ individual complaints.[25] Most of them are related to unpaid wages or
pensions. There are no accurate yearly
statistics about the number of labor disputes.
In 1993, official figures registered 233 labor strikes, even though strikes
are outlawed in China's Constitution.
In 1996, there were a total of 48,121 labor disputes, an increase of 50%
over the previous year, 1,700 enterprises had workers strikes or
slow-downs. In 1998, workers in Zigong,
Mianyang and Wuhan reportedly went on strike.
Some labor activists went even further by calling for the creation of an
autonomous labor union or labor party to compete with the official unions.[26]
Although the labor movement in China remains
largely reactive and passive, it can develop into a disastrous national unrest
that will jeopardize the current economic reform in China. The labor reform in the 1990s has reproduced
the chronicle problem faced by laborers in many capitalist economies in the
world, namely the alienation and frustration of labors. When labor becomes a commodity, laborers'
production activities become passive, involuntary and coercive. They will
inevitably lose their sense of pride on what they do. [27] These kinds of economic alienation will
generate political frustration over the official image of workers that has been
propagated over the years, and become a breading ground for labor unrest.
The Chinese government has been put on high alert
to any sign of labor unrest. It has
realized that the lack of social security and social insurance system has
contributed to most of the recent labor protests. The government proposed in 1998 a policy of "dual
guarantees," namely, to guarantee the minimum of standard of living
payment for the laid-off workers and pension payment for retirees. In September
1999, the government raised the monthly pension and unemployment payment by
15-30 percent. Unpaid pension money will be paid in a lump-sum payment by the
central government. Employment centers
are established by all enterprises that have downsized their labor forces. There are 6 millions workers now registered
with these centers. An underground
labor movement is on the rise. There
are many attempts on the part of workers to set up independent trade
unions. Some even tried to establish a
Chinese Labor Party. The stability-minded government is determined to put down
any demand for labor autonomy. Many
labor activists have been jailed or exiled.
Now and
Then
The two labor reforms differ sharply from one
another. The first reform is indeed
revolutionary. It drastically improved
labor's status in the society and established a whole new system of labor
relations in the workplace. Rationalization,
reorganization and retreat characterize the second reform. While the first one
focuses on breakthroughs, coercion and control, the second one focuses on
improving efficiency, management coherence and coordination.[28]
State-owned enterprises will be trimmed, but will stay. Workers' job security and safety net will
be changed, but not be easily withered away. Social services provided by the
units will be terminated, but will be replaced by other types of social
services provided by the society and the government at various levels; Trade
unions will be more active and workers will become more self-protective though
labor disputes, but party control will remain.
Overall, the new reform is neither a rejection of the first one entirely
nor a simple return to the pre-1949 wage labor system.
The nature of the labor
relations after the 1950s' labor reform is cooperative rather than
antagonistic. Ideological principles
and the "shared" interests of the state, management and labor are the
main theme. The mechanism of coordinating labor relations is based on tight
administrative control over employment, wages, labor administration, labor
protection, health care and pension, and union activities. The state is the ultimate manager of the
labor relations. This type of labor
relationship is essentially bipartite.
The harmonious relations are based on the ideology of egalitarianism in
which income gap between managers and between workers is relatively small.[29] Workers are in general complacent. The first
labor reform is featured by an enlargement of the size of the working class,
added new benefits and welfare, cooperative relationship between the management
and the labor. Laborers depend on the
state for welfare, for job security and for health care security; they depend
on the state for justice and for fair treatment; they also depend on the state
for leadership and for directions. The
state ties the laborers together through its patronage. The most commonly accepted notion of labor
rights, namely, the right to organize unions, the right to collective bargain,
and the right to dispute is totally redefined in this kind of environment.
The latest labor reform
turns the traditional cooperative relationship between the state and the
laborers into an antagonistic one. The state has withdrawn from
enterprise-level management. Market,
instead of state command, will dictate most part of the business
operation. The relationship between
workers and enterprise management "is now based primarily on an exchange
of economic interests rather than on cooperative comradeship or
collectivity."[30]
The decentralization of labor management power to the enterprise level has
caused deterioration of labor-management relations, and creates many
theoretical dilemmas. Are workers still
masters any more? Disappointed workers
answer bluntly that it is simply a "big joke," or a "fancy
rhetoric." Are managers
"civil servants" anymore?
Frustrated managers insist that they are the ones who have to run the
factory and to make it profitable.[31]
These are welcome
frustrations because they are an indication of the formation of a new
tripartite labor relationship. Each
player in this new relationship possesses relative autonomy. The labor reform of the 1990s separates the
state from the bipartite labor relations, restores the state's role as a
manager of labor relations instead of being a direct participant in that
relations. The state functions as a
rule-maker and rule keeper. Its primary
mission is trying to maintain a balanced approach to both employees and
employers. At the moment, the state is preoccupied with enterprise reform. It gives an impression that the state is
abandoning workers, and makes an alliance with employers. But in the long run, the state will have to
maintain an intricate balance toward both.
Because of the lopsided approach, bold demands are
heard openly for labor autonomy. Labor activists argue that if the state is
willing to let enterprise managers to become independent to run their business,
it doesn't make sense for the state to continue to maintain a tight grip on
laborers. At the present, the CCP still
controls labor unions. Labor unions
have remained their bureaucratic and administrative nature, and do not act as a
true agent of workers. Union leaders
are guaranteed state benefits, and incorporated into various party and
governmental institutions (see Table 5).
In order to avoid the image of being another bureaucratic agency of the
government and the party,
Table 5
CCP's Influence over Trade Unions (unit: person)
____________________________________________________________________________________
Union's full time Have the benefits Members of CCP's Standing
Members of CCP's
Chair and Deputy of deputy
party and Party Committees Party Committees at
Chair administrative
posts at various levels various
levels
____________________________________________________________________________________
local
Union 195,648 105,443 82,320 9,212
national
Total 234,833 118,828 93,631 10,952
____________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: Zhongguo Gonghui Tongji Nianqian (The Statistical Yearbook of Chinese
Trade Union) (1993
Union must reform itself, and to play an active role in defending
laborer's rights.
As the labor contract system and collective
bargaining system begin to function under market socialism, the role of trade
unions will be strengthened. The Trade Union Law of 1992 permits
collective bargaining in private enterprises. The Labor Law of 1994 extends that right to all enterprises. It
provides that "a collective contract shall be concluded by the trade union
on behalf of the staff and workers with the enterprise." But in many private enterprises, there are
no organized unions. Faced with the mounting evidence of labor abuse in
foreign-owned and private-owned enterprises, the state has no choice but to
unionize laborers in these enterprises.
By 1998, 70% foreign-owned enterprises (53,600) established trade union,
and 30,000 private enterprises also established union organizations. [32]
To what extent unions in these enterprises will differ from unions in
state-owned enterprises remain to be seen.
The
practice of collective bargaining in China remains in its infancy. Many more changes need to be made in order
for the system to work. Unions role in settling labor disputes will also be
strengthened. The
sign of unions' expanded role is the new rules set up in the "Regulation
on Handling Enterprise Labor Disputes in the PRC" of 1993. The regulation mandates the establishment of
Labor Dispute Committees at the enterprise level. It stipulates that (1) such a committee must be presided by the
chairman of the enterprise trade union and (2) enterprises' decision to reduce
surplus workers must be made with participation of trade union representatives.
Take it as a whole, China's labor policy prior to
the 1980s can be characterized as one of state corporatism. The state managed labor relations to its
favor. According to Howard Wiarda, as
countries advanced into a more affluent society, societal corporatism seems to prevail. In a societal corporatist environment, the
state loosens its control over increasingly independent labor groups. Furthermore, the government is willing to have dialogues with those groups on an
equal basis. Persuasion rather than
coercion has become the norm of the political game. [33]
This is the stage when a truly civil society is in place. Is the current market transformation an
indication of any change in that direction?
According to one researcher,
In 1990
the National People's Congress ratified the International Labor Organization's
Convention 144 on tripartite consultation to implement international labor
standards. Representatives from the
three camps have already met and begun to set up a regular coordinating
system. The representatives come from
the Ministry of Labor(representing the state), the ACFTU (the workers) and the
China Enterprise Directors' Association (CEDA, the employers). "[34]
The stability-minded state still worries about the
de-stabilizing effect of labor disputes and collective bargaining. According to the Labor Law, all collective contracts negotiated between managers and
unions still need to be approved by state labor management agencies. China has ratified 18 Conventions of the
International Labor Organizations, but has yet to ratify several key
conventions including No. 87 (freedom of Association), No. 98 (The Right to
Organize and Collective Bargaining) and No. 105 (Abolition of Forced Labor).[35] China has a long way to go towards building
a civil society. The day for labor to
become an independent political force is yet to come. Nevertheless, China will move beyond state corporatism and
gradually evolve into an age of societal corporatism. From the political experience of Taiwan, the momentum for such a
transition will most likely take place when political reform is off the ground
in the near future.[36]
* The author want to thank Pat Carmony and He Li for their very helpful comments on the earlier version of this paper
Endnotes
[1] See Alan Liu, Mass Politics in the People's Republic : State and Society in Contemporary China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) p. 90
[2] Peihua Chen, " Geming hu? Zuhezhuyi Hu?: Hou Mao zedong Shiqi De Gonghui He Gongren Yundong (Revolutionary? Or Corporatism--Trade Union and Labor Movement in the Post-Mao Era)" Modern China Studies, Vol. 4, 1994
[3] Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (New York: International Publishers, 1948), pp. 24-25; p. 44
[4] See Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: the Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford University Press, 1993) and Lynda Shatter, Mao and the Workers: the Hunan Labor Movement 1920-1923 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1982)
[5] Merton Don Fletcher, Trade Union in Communist China, Ph.D. dissertation, 1968, UC Berkeley, University Microfilms, Ann Harber, MI, 1969
[6] The revised Provisional Measure regarding Worker's Retirement and Resignation of the State Council in the 1978 further increased retirement pension to 70% of retiree's regular wage if workers had worked over 20 years. Workers with disability can receive 80% of their regular pay as nursing fee. Female workers' maternity leave later also changed to three months.
[7] Peng Qingzhao, Gongren Zhengzhi Keben (Workers' Political Textbook) (Beijing: Workers Publishing House, 1952)
[8] See Andrew Walder, "Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests," The China Quarterly (March, 1987); Yimin Lin, "Between Government and Labor: Managerial Decision-making in Chinese Industry," Studies in Comparative Communism (December 1992), Vol. XXV, No. 4, pp. 381-404
[9] Peihua Chen, op cit., p.5
[10] See Howard Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: the Other Great "ism," (Amonk: NJ: M.E, Sharp, 1997); Daniel Chirot, "The Corporatist Model and Socialism," Theory and Society, no. 9 1980; Anita Chen, "Revolution or Corporatism--Trade Union and Labor Movement in Post-Mao Ear," Modern China Studies, no. 4, 1994
[11] Xin Gu, "Unemployment in Transition and the Reform of Chinese Socialist Welfare System, Modern China Studies, no. 3, 1998
[12] CCTV News [Online], May 5, 1999 (http://www.cctv.com/news/dailynews/199905/05/jingji/jj2.html)
[13] U.S. Department of Labor, Foreign laborTrend: China (1996), p. 6
[14] See a discussion of these reforms by Wei Yu, "Financing Unemployment and Pension System: What's wrong with China's Policy," Modern China Studies, no. 3, 1998
[15] Zhongguo Ribao[Online] Janueary 8, 1999, Sinanet (http://dailynews.sinanet.com/china/zhongguo/1999/0108/10.html)
[16] According to the latest official statistics, more than 60% public housing have been sold to private owners.
[17] Renming Ribao ( RMRB), October 10, 1998
[18] Chinese Academy of Social Science Web Page {Online] News (http://www.cass.net.cn/yuan/99-2-12-1.htm)
[19] Hu Angang, "Xunqiu Xinde Ruzuolu (Seeking New Soft Landing)," Liaowang (Beijing), vol. 31, 1997
[20] Feng Tongqing , “Workers and Trade Unions under the Market Economy: Perspectives from Grassroots Union Cadres,” Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Spring 1996 vol. 28, no. 4, p. 23.
[21] Anita Chan and Robert A. Senser, "China's Troubled Workers" Foreign Affairs, March/April 1997, pp. 106-107
[22] See Zhao, Minghua and Theo Nichols, "Management Control of Labor in State-Owned Enterprises," in Greg O'Leary ed., Adjusting to Capitalism (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharper, 1998)
[23] Anita Chan also edited a special edition, “the Conditions of Chinese Workers in East Asian-Founded Enterprises, ” for Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Summer 1998, vol.30, no. 4., which provided more detailed account of labor abuse in foreign-owned enterprise in China.
[24] Detailed accounts of some of the labor strikes can be found in "Zhongguo Gonghui Minaling Xintiaozan: Laozi Jiufen, (Chinese Trade Union Facing New Challenges: Labor Disputes)" China Press (Qiao Pao), Oct. 26, 1998; China and the World [Online}, no. 1, 1999 (http://www.china bulletin.com)
[25] Feng , op cit., p. 12.
[26] Han Dongfang, "A Long Hard Journey: the Riser of a Free Labor Movement"[Online], China Rights Forum, Winter 1995 (http://www.igc.apc.org/hric/crf/english/95winter/e9.html)
[27] C.H. Chang,, "The Nature of Labor Problem," Labor Research Quarterly (Taiwan), no. 95 (April 1989), p.102
[28] Lawrence D. Brown, New Policies, New Politics: Government's Response to Government's Growth (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983)
[29] Feng , op cit., pp. 7-8.
[30] Ibid., p. 7
[31] Ibid., pp.40-41
[32] RMRB, Oct. 19, 1998
[33] Howard Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: the Other Great "Ism" (Amonk, NJ: M.E. Sharpd).
[34] Feng, op cit., pp.11-12
[35] U.S. Department of Labor: Foreign Labor Trend: China (1994), p. 21
[36] For a discussion of Taiwan's labor policy, please see Baogang Guo, " A Comparative Study of Labor Policies in Mainland China and Taiwan," Modern China Studies, no. 1, 1999, pp. 104-124