Chapter 4
Old Paradigms, New Paradigms,
And Democratic Changes in China
Baogang Guo
The
1989 political crises in the former Soviet Union, the East European Communist
countries and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have generated a flurry of
fascinating discussions about the future of communist movements in the coming
millennium. Francis Fukuyama quickly
declared a triumph of liberalism and speculated that liberal democracy might
constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the
"final form of human government." [1] While rejecting Fukuyama's universalism,
Samuel Huntington suggested that the old analytical paradigm of two-way
ideological confrontation between the western democracies led by the United
States and the communist regimes led by the Soviet Union had already become
obsolete. The clashes of civilizations,
according to Huntington, will become a recurring theme in the 21st
century.[2]
Both
projections are based on the assumption that the communist social movement is
over and the remaining socialist countries will soon fellow the footsteps of
their East European counterparts as well. Nevertheless, more than ten years
have passed. China seems to stand firm
against all odds. It has not only survived, but also thrived through the two
decades of market-oriented reforms.
Indeed, the success story of China's economic reform and the rapid
growth of its economy have given rise to the new prediction of "a coming
conflict" between the U.S. and China.[3] On the Chinese side, the cliché that "only socialism can
save China" can rarely being heard nowadays. In order to save socialism,
Chinese reformers have tried everything from the stock market to the
shareholding system. They, too, talked
about the paradigmatic changes. Since the 1980s, the Chinese communist has
invented new theory called "the primitive stage of socialism" to
justify the return to the market economy. The 15th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) reiterated the primitive nature of China's socialism, and
endorsed a plan to privatize small- and medium-size public-owned businesses and
to establish modern enterprise system for the large-size state-owned companies.
The
prevailing consensus among the top Chinese leaders is that the socialist model
implemented during the Mao era is too "advanced," and that since
China remains largely underdeveloped, it has to step back from this
"advanced" socialism to a primitive stage of socialism, namely the
market socialism. In this Chapter, we will challenge this line of reasoning. We argue that China's transition towards a
market economy is a major paradigmatic change.
It is in our view a departure rather than a retreat from the so-called
" advanced" socialism. For nearly a century, it was the Leninist and
Stalinist tradition that dominated the communist movement throughout the
world. The paradigm developed under
this tradition is commonly referred to as state socialism, which is defined in
this study as an economic and political system designed to entirely socialize
the existing social and economic relationships into one of state domination.
The alternative model that has been developed by European social democrats is
the democratic socialism, which emphasizes democracy, liberalism and a gradual
socialization of means of production. We will argue in the following discussion
that the sea change that has taken place in China in recent years reflects an
only alteration of the state socialist paradigm, and a but also progressive
congruence between the two socialist models. Contrary to Fukuyama's view, we
believe that socialism will continue to be relevant in the new millennium, and
the future of the world will remain to be as diversified as it has always
been. To illustrate these points, we will
first study the origin of the state socialist paradigm and its alteration by
Russian Communists. Next, we will analyze the roots and failure of the state
socialism in China. Finally, we will
review the transformation of the state socialism that is currently underway in
China.
Genesis
of the State Socialism
The
state socialism endorsed by the world communist movements was a product of
Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. Its
totalitarian nature was well documented.[4] The main feature of this system include a
command economy, state-control over all property-rights, one-party rule, and
democratic centralism. Many scholars
have pointed out the significant differences between Marx's blueprint for
socialism and Russian's practice. In The Communist Manifesto, one can find
that Marx and Engels called for the wresting of all capitals from the
bourgeoisie and the seizure of all instruments of production "in the hands
of state" by means of "despotic inroads." The bourgeoisie
capitals, according to Marx and Engels, would become "common
properties" shared by "all the members of the society."[5] However, they were ambiguous about how the
common property or public ownership could be realized.
According
to a study by Michael Harrington, an American socialist, Marx and Engels never
fully endorsed the notion that the state ownership of the means of production
was the preferred form of public ownership.
Marx and Engels considered socialism to be merely a conscious
recognition of the social nature of the modern forces of production, the social
form of socialization. A share-holding system, for example, was considered by
Marx to be one type of public ownership.[6]
It was terribly wrong, according to a letter written by Engels in 1881, for
socialists "to accept what the capitalists themselves pretend to believe,
that state ownership is socialist."[7] This statement is apparently an effort by
Engels to dispute the claim that the nationalization scheme of the Bismarkian
Germany in the 1880s was equivalent to the socialization process he and Marx
had envisioned under socialism.
Unfortunately, according to Harrington, it is this format of
state-driven nationalization, forced modernization and substitution of, rather
than the transcending of, capitalism that became the leading trend of the
socialist movement in the Third World countries in much of the twentieth
century.[8]
Marx
and Engels's vision of proletarian dictatorship has also frequently been
misinterpreted, according to some analysts.
Marx predicted that the capitalist society would simplify and polarize
the capitalist society into two distinctive social classes: the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat. The deprivation of
private property (bourgeoisie capital, not individual property), according to
them, would lead to a proletarian dictatorship. The majority would undertake the dictatorship since the
proletariat consisted of nine-tenths of the population. All other social classes, including
peasants, the artisans, the shopkeepers, and the small manufacturers would
eventually become a part of the special and essential product of capitalism:
the proletariat. Notably, peasants are
ranked together with other lower middle classes as a non-revolutionary
conservative class. It is in this
analysis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is understood as essentially
democratic since the bourgeoisie as a social class will disappear quickly as
soon as their capitals are socialized.
For
Marx, every state was by definition a dictatorship. But Marx argued strongly
for a democratic republic and preservation of the institution of the existing
representative democracy under capitalism.[9] Marx considered the Paris Commune a working
class dictatorship because the property form of the society was organized in
favor of the working class.[10] He also linked the democratic nature of the
proletarian rule with the Paris Commune since it provided democratic components
such as self-government and immediate recall of all elected officials. Engels even made clear that the democratic
republic then existed in the United States, was "the specific form of the
dictatorship of the proletariat."[11] Neither Marx nor Engels endorsed the
one-party rule, and that was primarily Lenin's invention.
Lenin
as a theorist and a practitioner of Marxism further developed the instrumental
approach towards the state. A socialist
state, as defined by Lenin, is an instrument for the repression of the
proletarian social class. Lenin's
interpretation of the dictatorship of the proletariat includes: (1) the
dictatorship of the proletariat can not be exercised through a mass party which
embraces the entire working class; instead, it can only be exercised by "a
vanguard [party] that has absorbed the revolutionary energy of that
class;" and (2) the dictatorship of the proletariat means the rule of the
proletariat "unrestricted by any law." [12]
This, unquestionably, laid the foundation of the one-party rule and the
party-state that existed in all socialist counties in the 20th
century.[13]
With
regard to the issue of socialization, Lenin was rather realistic. He pointed out that the seizure of private
property and state ownership in itself was not enough to build a socialism
society. Nationalization without real control by workers, according to Lenin,
was simply not enough.[14] Indeed, Lenin was the first Marxist leader
who realized that a transitional period between a capitalist society and a
socialist one was needed. In an
economically backward country like Russia, Lenin asserted, the proletarian
state must follow the "change of historical order" and establish
first of all an "industrial and commercial civilization".[15] The New Economic Policy initiated by Lenin
was his answer to materialize such a transition. However, the early death of Lenin and the transfer of power to
Stalin altered the course of the Soviet Union's development.
Stalin's
"revolution from above" and "theory of socialism in one
country" redefined the meaning of socialism, and canonized the paradigm of
the state socialism. Stalin forcibly
carried out his agricultural collectivization program between 1929-1934 and
pushed his industrialization programs through consecutive five-year plans. Since the state was the sole investor of all
the factories, state ownership became the symbol of socialism. Stalin was able to achieve his goal of rapid
modernization in a relatively short period of time, thanks to the sacrifices
made by common citizens who cherished the ideas of social equality and justice
for all, and the forced "primitive capital accumulation" through
unfair price scissors between industrial and agricultural products. But in the long run all the deficiencies and
problems that China faced when the economic reform started two decades ago had
already surfaced at the end of Stalin's era.
Without market, Soviet economy faced chronic shortages of consumer
goods, low productivity, and bureaucratic red tapes; and without democracy,
majority tyranny and "red terror" prevailed.
State Socialism in China
The
Chinese communist revolution took place in a traditional society. Peasants were the pivotal forces of that
revolution. There were only a small number of modern industries before
1949. However, Mao Zedong and his
communist comrades believed that they could build socialism in economically
backward China. State socialism was adopted when the CCP seized power in
1949. The Communists set to work on the
transforming China from a "semi-feudal and semi-colonial" society
into a socialist one. With this vision
in mind, the CCP nationalized China's industries in urban areas, and collectivized
its agriculture sector during the 1950s.
The CCP officially declared the completion of this transformation in
1957, and designated China as a new socialist country.
From
very early on, some of the CCP's top leaders viewed the socialization of
agriculture and the state-driven industrialization as the crucial elements of
socialism. Mao wrote in 1949,
"[w]ithout the socialization of agriculture, there [would] be no complete
and consolidated socialism" and "to carry out the socialization of
agriculture a powerful industry with state-owned enterprises as the main
component must be developed."[16]
Mao was critical of Stalin in many areas. But the Soviet model was still the
only variable model China could emulate at that time. By 1955, the CCP decided to move China beyond the stage of
"the new democratic revolution" and to speed up the socialist
transformation. In the countryside
peasants were organized, by stages, into collective farms and later to the
People's Communes, which were equivalent to Kolkhoz (collective farms)
in the Soviet Union. In cities, private
businesses were forced to form state-private joint enterprises, and eventually
to accept the redemption of their factories or retail stores by the state or
other collective units. Most of these
transitions were completed between 1955 and 1956. Ownership now was entirely in the hands of the state and the
collective entitles. The state
ownership was considered better than the collective ownership, and the
collective ownership was better than the state-private joint ownership. "Large in size and having a higher
degree of public ownership" (Yi Da Er Gong) became an ultimate goal
of socialism.[17]
By
this time, Mao clearly had accepted Stalin's definition of socialism: Leninist
state,[18]
state ownership, state planning, one-party rule, and class struggle. In the next twenty years in power, Mao
advanced this version of socialism to the extreme, and developed his
"theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the
proletariat." Mao claimed that
class struggle was a permanent feature of a socialist society, and that this
struggle also existed within the communist party. The task of the CCP, according to Mao, was to wage continued
class struggles by means of "great democracy" (Da Minzhu) and mass campaigns to remove "capitalist
roaders" from power. Democracy by
Mao's definition was only a means, not an end.
Mao's definition of democracy was influenced by feudal egalitarianism,
majority tyranny and democratic centralism.[19]
Chinese
state socialism is not the kind of socialism that grows out of an advanced
capitalism; it is a "pre-capitalist socialism." The socialist practice in the last forty
years resembles in many ways the elements of both agrarian utopianism and
feudal socialism. European feudal socialism was an ideology of the old aristocracies
in the eighteenth century. Maoism,
however, absorbed a different kind of feudal socialism: not from aristocracy,
but from China's intellectual and political traditions. This kind of feudal socialism is based on
the idea of Da Tong (translated into "great harmony" or
"great community"), the Chinese version of agrarian utopia. Da Tong philosophy calls for
enlightened despots (Ming Jun),
agrarianism (Tu Jun) and welfare of
the common people (Min Ben). Mencius, for instance, stated that
government ultimately rested upon the will of the people, and that people had a
right to overthrow an immoral ruler.
His well-field system (Jing Tian
Zhi) was aimed at achieving equal distribution of all land (Tu Jun),
an idea that first appeared in the Rites
of Zhou.[20] Another contributor to Chinese
egalitarianism is Xu Xing, the Agriculturist (Nong Jia) in the Warring States.
Xu Xing advocated a society with no distinction between those who worked
with their minds and those who worked with their hands, and between the rulers
and the ruled.[21] The Chinese political tradition also has an
abundance of agrarian or feudal socialist vestiges. The Tang dynasty's magnificent accomplishments between the
7th-8th centuries had a lot to do with its well-known land system, "the equal-field
system" (Jun Tian Zhi), which
put the ownership of most lands in the hand of the state (symbolized by
emperor's ownership). The public lands
were distributed and periodically redistributed equally among peasants,
including women. Another example is the
Taiping Rebellion in the 19th century.
Taiping leader Hong Xiouquan combined traditional Chinese agrarianism
with Christianity, and created the first Chinese utopia, the Heavenly Kingdom
of Eternal Peace (Tai Ping Tian Guo),
in southern China where state ownership and universal brotherhood were its
central features.
Mao
in many ways drew more insights from these intellectual and political
traditions in China than from Marx's.
He wanted "land to the tillers," and did so by confiscating
landlords' properties and distributed them to the poor peasants; he wanted to minimize the difference between
intellectuals and the peasants, and did so by policies like "San Tong" (eat, live and work
together with peasants)," and "Shang
Shan Xia Xiang" and "Gan Bu Xia Fang" (sending
students and cadres to work in the countryside); and he wanted to be an
enlightened ruler open to criticism, and did so by launching the "letting
a hundred flowers blossom and letting a hundred schools of thought
content" campaign. Nevertheless,
in the end he re-collectivized peasants' private land, created a permanent
class demarcation between peasants and all other social classes, and suppressed
intellectual challenges to his one-party rule.
In his well-known study of American
democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out that although the "absolute
sovereignty of the will of the majority [was] the essence of democratic
government", the greatest danger to democracy came from the
"omnipotence of the majority," namely the majority tyranny.[22] Majority tyranny refers to a situation in
which the majority uses its advantage in numbers to suppress the rights of the
minority.[23] We witnessed this kind of tyranny first hand
during the Cultural Revolution in which workers and peasants took power into
their own hands, unchecked and uncontrolled, resulting in frequent social
anarchy.
The Chinese peasant
revolution produced a popular government, which made it easier for the majority
to "sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and
the rights of other citizens."[24] Mao Zedong defined the nature of the new
Chinese state as one of "the democratic dictatorship of the
people." He interpreted his new
state system as "democracy towards the people and dictatorship towards
reactionaries." Mao claimed that
under the people's democratic dictatorship, "the right of reactionaries to
voice their opinions must be abolished and only the people are allowed to have
the right of voicing their opinions."[25] But Mao did have a broader definition of the
concept of "people" earlier on.
His concept of people included working classes, peasants, the petty
bourgeoisie (intellectuals, white-collar workers, shopkeepers, etc.), and
national bourgeoisie (independent factory owners who do not have close
association with foreigners and landlords), and his definition of the so-called
reactionaries included the landlord, the bureaucratic capitalist, and the Nationalists. In Mao's later years, however, he was
obsessed with the theory of class struggle.
He singled out five classes of people or
"five bad elements" including landlords, rich peasants,
anti-revolutionary, people with criminal records, rightists (dissenting
intellectuals, and dissenting leaders within the government) as the target of
state suppression. The anti-rightist
movement and "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" created a
large number of new class enemies.
Since they were not part of the people, physical torture,
self-incrimination, social discrimination, and forced labor were routinely used
to show the muscle of the "majority will."
State socialism put the
state above the society and emphasizes the omnipotence of the state. State socialism embraces a political
structure that is unitary in nature. In
Leninist-Maoist term, it is simply called "democratic centralism."
Democratic centralism means "the unity of democracy and centralism and the
unity of freedom and discipline."[26] But in the end, it was centralism and
discipline that were given much emphasis to fight with calls for democracy and
freedom. Once in power the CCP announced that the Western
parliamentary system was not compatible with socialism since it was used by the
bourgeoisie state, and that a socialist state would be better off if it
established a centralized and unitary political system. Advocates of this system frequently cited
Marx's comment about the Paris Commune when Marx said the socialist state
should be an institution in charge of both legislation and administration
through a representative body (Yi Xing He
Yi).[27]
The
assumption that political competition, multiparty systems, and parliamentary
systems are all products of a bourgeoisie state is fundamentally flawed. As we
pointed out earlier, Marx and Engels' strongly reject the notion that communism
will abolish individuality and freedom.
According to them, only bourgeoisie individuality and freedom to buy and
sell will be abolished.
"Communism," declared by Marx and Engels, "deprives no
man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to
deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such
appropriation."[28]
State
socialists in Mao's era, nonetheless, did precisely that. By classifying democratic institutions and
political structure adopted in Western countries as capitalistic, it put itself
in a position that it had to come up with some better alternatives. Apparently this was not an easy task. By resorting to the political unitarianism,
China lost its political dynamism. Old
feudal practices were put into place, and a new privileged "bureaucratic
class" quietly became a new ruling class. Many people eventually realized
that much of what had been experimented in "new China" could only be
characterized as a sort of man-made grafting or "artificial
insemination."[29]
What came out from this process was an abnormal specie that simply could not
grow normally. Socialism based on this
kind of idyllic creation was doomed to be elusive and counterproductive.
State
Socialism in Transition
China
has undertaken breathtaking changes since the 1980s. The economic reforms carried out by Deng Xiaoping not only have
brought tremendous growth in the nation's economy, but also have broken many
ideological taboos. Deng and his supporters have taken bold steps to reverse
the socialist transformation undertaken between 1955-1956, and to reinstate the
policy of coexistence of both public and private ownership implemented during
the "New Democracy" period.
The People's Communes were subsequently disbanded in the 1980s. Farmers have been allowed to rent a piece of
public land for an extended period of time based on family contracts they
signed with the collectives. In cities,
private ownership has been encouraged and accepted as an important
supplementary part of the socialist economy.
Foreign-owned and joint stock companies have mushroomed and became one
of fastest growing economic sectors.
The mentality of seeking "large size and high level of public
ownership" is finally put to an end.
Overall, there are three types of transition that can be identified.
The
essence of Deng Xiaoping's reform is to make rooms for markets in the socialist
system. Market socialism now is
accepted as an alternative to the state socialism. In doing so, China has joined many other former and existing
socialist reformers who have been seeking for years for an alternative to the
planned economy.
Market socialism is not a new
idea. It first emerged in the
1930s. Friedrick Hayek proposed to
incorporate market into state planning process.[30] Oskar Lange suggested a total market price
for consumer goods, and semi-regulated industrial pricing by Central Planing
Bureau (CPB).[31] Yugoslavia was the first socialist country
that implemented a market-oriented reform and a system of self-government by
workers since the 1950s. The chapter by
Thomas Lum in this book also discussed the reform movement in Hungary, which
include introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1968. However, all early experiments with market
socialism failed because of the continued political control over production
decisions and the lack of competition.[32]
China's own march towards a market economy is
also a protracted journey. It took
nearly eighteen years for the reformers to finalize a blueprint for a market
economy. From 1979 to 1998, China's
attitude towards market changed several times.
Initially, the market was only given minimum attention. Socialism was understood as primarily a
planned economy where the market had a limited use. At the second stage, the planned economy was replaced with the
concept of a commodity economy. In 1987, Deng Xiaoping for the first time
emphasized that the planning should no longer be the primary mechanism
for the economy. Instead, both the
market and planning should be treated as useful tools for promoting the
development of the productive forces. By 1992, at last, the concept of
commodity economy was replaced by the concept of a socialist market
economy. In November 1993, the CCP
adopted a resolution that for the first time discussed in details about the
market economy. [33] As reform progressed, reformers began to
touch upon some of key questions of the state socialism: What is public
ownership? How can it be realized in an
economically backward country like China?
The
well-known Chinese liberal economist Li Youwei has argued strongly for
restructuring the existing form of public ownership through socialization. He points out that the complete public
ownership envisioned by Engels is not realistic in a developing country such as
China. The only form of public
ownership that is compatible with the primitive stage of socialism is what he
calls the social ownership. He suggests
that the socialization of the means of production at the current stage can only
be realized by promoting social ownership instead of state ownership. By social ownership, he means a system of
producer stock ownership to transform capitalist minority private ownership
into a producer's majority social ownership.
In other words, it is what Marx called the "reestablishment of
individual ownership"--turning the proletariat into a property-owning
working class at the first.[34] Li is not the first one to promote the
concept of stock socialism. Wang Yu, a
Chinese professor, proposed the similar concept in 1994. He suggested that the stock ownership by
individual workers should be the main form of public ownership.[35]
In
the speech made to the 15th Party Congress, Jiang Zemin also expressed a
similar view over the issue of public ownership. He made the following remarks regarding the changing
conceptualization of socialism, especially the issue of public ownership,
market, and the primitive nature of China's socialist system: (1) socialism is the primitive stage of
communism, and China is in the primitive stage of socialism; (2) public ownership will maintain its
dominant position in the economy, especially in key economic sectors, but the
form of public ownership will be diversified.
State-ownership is only one form of public ownership, and it too can be
combined and integrated with other forms of ownership, such as
stock-cooperative ownership.
In
each of these new conceptual breakthroughs, the vestige of state socialism
remains. While allowing the diversity of public ownership, the influence of the
idea that the "higher level of public ownership is superior to the lower
level public ownership" persists.
According to Jiang's statement the flexibility that is to be introduced
is simply because of the backwardness of the existing economy, and once China
reaches the developed stage of socialism state ownership and planning will
return. With regard to democracy, the
extent of political freedom to be tolerated is still linked with the one-party
rule. The Deng-Jiang version of
"socialism with Chinese characteristics" apparently is a product of
the new authoritarianism that have prevailed among the elite circle.
Deng
Xiaoping's market socialist theory echoes a lot of arguments made by European
and American social democrats. Indeed,
the practical and theoretical changes engineered by the Chinese reformers have
narrowed the gap between the Marxist-Leninist socialist movement in the East
and the democratic socialist movement in the West. This posts at least three
theoretically and empirically very challenging questions: (1) Will the two
socialist movements merge in the near future?
(2) What is the likelihood such conversion will occur? (3) Under what
conditions will it happen?
Democratic
socialism originated from the Socialist International when Edward Bernstein,
one of the first right-wing German social democratic revisionists of Marx,
challenged Marx by proposing that socialism could be developed within
capitalism. Karl Kautsky made the
similar arguments. He asserted that socialism was the culmination of capitalism
as well as its transformation, and it was defined by that fact rather than by
the socialists themselves. The socialists'
task, according to Kautsky, was not to organize a socialist revolution, but to
organize for the revolution; it was not to make the revolution, but to take
advantage of it.[36] He was the first socialist who defined
socialism by using the term of "socialization." For him, the socialization was the ownership
by the democratic state of the large-scale industry, which was an inevitable
outcome of capitalist development. The Congress of the Socialist International
in the Frankfurt Congress of 1951 accepted Kautskian definition of socialism:
Socialism
is a system that features a mix of public and cooperative ownership of
essential industries, and private ownership in agriculture, handicraft, retail
trade, and small and middle-sized industries.
Under socialism, cooperative ownership is preferred whenever possible.[37]
American
socialist Michael Harrison defined socialization as the democratization of
decision making process in the everyday economy, state guarantee of essential
human rights such as health and education, and new mode of social ownership
such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Even the nationalized industries, according to Harrington, also
had to be socialized to allow self-government and producer's participation in
the decision-making process.[38]
In addition to advocating social ownership, European and American social
democrats also emphasize the continuity of bourgeoisie democratic
institutions. Rosa Luxembourg, the
left-wing revisionist of the German Communist Party, once pointed out that "[i]t
is the historical task of the proletariat, when it comes to power, to replace
bourgeois democracy with socialist democracy, not to abolish democracy itself. [39]
The Frankfurt Declaration of the
Socialist International also claims that "[s]ocialism can be achieved only
in a democratic system by democratic means."[40]
The
CCP has criticized European social democrats for years. Now suddenly it finds itself gradually
endorsing most of their ideas. For instance, Bernstein's analysis of the
neutrality of the stock ownership has been given serious discussion in the
academic circle.[41] The need for a theory of democracy has been
given a high priority.[42]
The Communists may reject "the peaceful revolution" advocated by its
European counterparts by pointing out the brutality of its political enemies it
had to face in its prolonged struggle against the bourgeoisie
Nationalists. Without a revolution, it
can be rightful stated, communists themselves could have ceased to exist a long
time ago. It may be unrealistic to
apply this kind of peaceful approach European social democrats have advocated
to the Chinese situation. However, the
difference over the means of socialist transition, whether it is violent or
peaceful, should not prevent a reunification of the international socialist
movement. After all, China has already
practiced many policies championed by European socialists for years. The differences between Chinese socialists
and European democratic socialists have increasingly been narrowed. The CCP's use of revolutionary means only
necessitates the need for the transition of the CCP from a revolutionary party
to a democratic party in the post-revolution phase. The fact is that the transformation is yet to take place in
China.
Communist
leaders in China, especially Mao Zedong, acted more or less like peasant rebel
leaders after their victory. They held
the political power as a war trophy, and did not want to share it with any one
else. The idea of "rotating
governorship" (Lun Liu Zuo Zhuang)
was quickly denounced. The leadership
of Communist Party was interpreted as a complete party control of the
state. Despite the claim made by the
current reform leaders that the political reform has to go hand in hand with
the economic reform, little has been done to reshape the authoritarian
political structure. There may be some
legitimate practical concerns, such as maintaining stability, that prevent the
CCP from carrying out a radical political reform. The real issue here, however, is its sense of insecurity and fear
of losing political control in a competitive political system.
The
likelihood of a radical conversion to democratic socialism is clearly not in
sight judged from the actions and speeches made by the so-called leaders of the
third generation in the CCP. But piecemeal changes are surely happening. The
pressure for more radical political reforms is also building up. The lopsided
approach towards reforms has already created new contradictions within an
already strained political system.
These contradictions include: (1) the insistence on a theory which
stresses class struggle and dictatorship over the bourgeoisie class on the one
hand, and the protection and encouragement of the growth of capitalist economic
sectors and capitalists as a new social group on the other; (2) the attempt to
separate market economies from capitalism on the one hand, and the continued
linkage of political competition, multi-party systems and parliamentary systems
with capitalism on the other; and (3) the intention to transform state
socialism to primitive socialism on the one hand, and the refusal to transform
the state that goes along with the state socialism on the other. The leaders in
China prefer to solving these contradictions through piecemeal political
reforms. Deng Xiaoping was the first
CCP leader who campaigned for political reforms in the 1980s. "Whether or not all of our reforms
are eventually going to success,"
said Deng, was "determined by the reform of our political system."[43]
Like many state socialists, Deng Xiaoping shrank Marxism into just one
fundamental dogma, namely, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without the dictatorship, according to him,
socialism "cannot resist the attack from capitalism."[44] For that reason he strongly opposed any
political reform that may jeopardize the CCP's one-party rule. He acknowledged
the existence of the strong feudal influence in the existing political
structure, such as the excessive centralization of power, political tenure for
state officials, paternalism, patriarchal clan system, hierarchical system,
bureaucracy, and political inequality.[45] One of the goals of the political reform,
according to Deng, was to eliminate the "influence of the remains of
feudalism."[46]
Deng
was able to use his power to make some significant changes in the Communist
practice of the proletarian dictatorship.
One of Deng Xiaoping's accomplishments was the termination of the
ruthless use of class struggles and mass political campaigns. Deng Xiaoping tried to minimize the use of
the term "dictatorship" and to prevent the menace of the majority
tyranny for which he himself suffered dearly during the Cultural
Revolution. Most rightists, who had
been persecuted for two decades, were set free or rehabilitated. The sons and daughters of former factory
owners, landlords and rich peasants were no longer the target of political
persecution. The term of
"dictatorship of the proletariat" was dropped from the Chinese
constitution and replaced with the expression of the "people's democratic
dictatorship" in the 1982 Constitution.
The crime of "anti-revolutionary" was eventually removed from
the Chinese Criminal Law in 1996, and from the Chinese Constitution in
1999.
These
changes have posted new challenges to the official ideologies. If dictatorship
nowadays simply means suppression of criminals, then what is the difference
between the dictatorship of the people's democracy and the democratic governing
in other countries? As one anonymous
author suggested in his poster at Beijing University in 1989, that "we
would do better to have 'dictatorship against their enemies' change to
'sanctions, authorized by laws... against criminals.'"[47] Deng Xiaoping opened up a historical
opportunity for China to develop a genuine democracy. But he failed the expectation the whole world had placed upon him
by leaving behind a legacy of political intolerance. It may take a couple of more generations of Communist leaders to
really move beyond this legacy.
Conclusion
China
still has a long way to go towards a genuine democracy. The purpose of this study is to analyze the
possibility of a peaceful democratic transition in China. We have exposed the pseudo-socialist nature
of Mao's political and economic experiments.
We are encouraged by the success of the on-going economic reforms, and
would like to see those reforms extend to political arena as well. We
anticipate the piecemeal political changes will eventually result in the
opening up of the political process in China.
The emergence of the democratic socialism in China may take place in
many ways. It is not our job to project
the future courses China will take. But
we are certainly optimistic about China's democratic future.
Endnotes
[1] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992)
[2] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
of the World Order (New York: Touchstone Books, 1998)
[3] Richard Bernstein & Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New
York: Vintage Books, 1998)
[4]Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism
(San Diego: Harcourt, 1968)
[5]Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International Publisher, 1948), p. 24, p. 30
[6] Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, Ch. 27 "The Role of Credit in Capitalist
Production" (New York: Penguin, 1993)
[7]. Cited in Michael
Harrington, Socialism: Past and Future
(New York: Penguin Group, 1994), p. 18.
[8]. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
[9]. The Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 22, p. 274, cited in
Xie Qingkui et al., Zhengguo Zhengfu Tizhi Fenxi
(An Analysis of the Chinese Government System) (Beijing, The
Broadcasting and Television Press, 1995), p. 14.
[10]. Gary J. Dorrien, The Democratic Socialist Vision (Totowa,
NJ: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 1986), p. 116.
[11]. Cited in Michael
Harrington, op cit., p. 45.
[12]. A speech Lenin gave on
trade unions in the Soviet system at the end of 1920, ibid., and pp. 74-75.
[13] Xie Qingkui, et al., op cit.
[14]. Harrington, op cit., p. 78.
[15].Shi Huasheng,
"Facing Marx," China Monthly, No. 50, 1997.
[16]. Mao Zedong, "The
Dictatorship of the People's Democracy," in de Bary, et al.,Sources of
Chinese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), Vol. 2 ., p. 232.
[17]. Li Youwei, "Guanyu
Suoyoushi Ruogan Wenti De Sikao" (Some Thoughts on the Issues of
Ownership), China and the World, No.
8, 1997.
[18].The key feature of the
Leninist state is state autonomy. See
Barrett L. McCormick, Political Reform in
Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990).
[19]. Lei Guang,
"Elusive Democracy: Conceptual Change and the Chinese Democracy Movement,
1978-1989," Modern China
(October-December 1996), Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 417.
[20]. John E. Schrecker, The Chinese Revolution in Historical
Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1991), p. 23.
[21]. Mencius, Mencius, Book 3A, Sec. 4, trans. by D.
C. Lau (London, 1970), p. 100, cited in Schrecker, op cit., p. 23.
[22]. Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America (Garden City,
NY: Anchor Press, 1969), pp. 246-261.
[23]. Peverill Squire, et al., Dynamics of Democracy, 2nd
ed. (Madison, WI: Brown &
Benchmark Publishers, 1997)
p. 32.
[24]. James Madison,
"Federalist Papers No. 10" in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and
John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed.,
Garry Wills (New York: Bantnam Books, 1982), p. 45.
[25]. Mao Zedong, "The
dictatorship of the People's Democracy," in de Bary, ed., op cit., p. 229.
[26]. Mao Zedong, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
among the People, in de Bary, op cit.,
pp. 273-275.
[27]. Xie Qinkui, et al., op cit., p. 15.
[28]. Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, op cit., p. 26-25.
[29]. Anonymous, "The
Four Cardinal Principles: Levers for Reform, or Bars to Changes?"
small-character poster at Beijing University, May 9, 1989, cited in Han Minzhu
ed., op cit., p. 166; Shi Huasheng, op cit.
[30]. Friedrick Hayek,
"The Nature and History of the Problem," in Collectivist Economic Planning, ed., F. A. Hayek (London: George
Routledge & Son, 1987).
[31]. Oskar Longe, "On
the Economic Theory of Socialism," in On
the Economic Theory of Socialism, ed., B. Lippincott (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1956).
[33] Renming Ribao (Overseas Edition),
"Zhong Gong Shi Yi Jie San Zhong Quan Hui Yi Lai Da Shi Ji"(Major
Events since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress of the CCP), December 16, 1998
[34]. Li Youwei, op cit.
[35] Cao Yiping & Song Jun,
"Laodongzhe Geren Gufen Suoyouzhi Yin Shi Gongyouzhi De Zhuyao
Xingshi"(Stock Ownership by Individual Workers Should be The Main Form of
Public Ownership), Xinhua Wenzhai
(August 1994)
[36]. Michael Harrington, op cit., pp. 49-59.
[37]. "The Frankfurt
Declaration," adopted at the Founding Congress of the Socialist
International at Frankfurt, West German, July 1951. Reprinted as Appendix I in
Norman Thomas, Socialism Reexamined
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1963).
[38]. Michael Harrington, op cit., ch. 7.
[39]. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
[40]. Gary Dorrien, op cit., p. 113.
[41] Han Chenjun, "Gufenzhi Bingfei
'Diguo Zhuyi De Jinji Jichu'--Lenin Yu 'Xiuzheng Zhuyi' Lunzhan Xinshuo"
(The Stock System is not ' the Essential Feature of Imperialism'--A New
Interpretation of the Debate between Lenin and the Revisioists), Henan Shekejie(Henan Social Science Circle)
(December 1998).
[42] Liu Zhifeng, "Minzhu Si Shehui
Zhuyi De Qizhi"(Democracy is the Banner of Socialism), Zhongguo
Gaige Bao, August 27, 1998
[43]. Deng Xiaoping, To Build a Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics (revised ed.) p. 133, cited in Xie Qinkui, et al., op cit., p. 27.
[44]. The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, op cit., Vol. 3., p. 365.
[45]. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982), p. 294, cited from
Xie Qingkui, et al., op cit., p. 29.
[46]. Ibid., p. 295.
[47]. Han Minzhu, op cit., p. 169.